Insurance-Linked Securities, Sidecars, Collateralized Reinsurance, ILWs, and Alternative Reinsurance Capital
Insurance-Linked Securities, Sidecars, Collateralized Reinsurance, Industry Loss Warranties, and Alternative Reinsurance Capital
Insurance-linked securities represent a broad and increasingly institutionalized segment of the capital markets in which investors assume insurance and reinsurance risk in exchange for premium income or spread over collateral returns. While catastrophe bonds remain the most visible and liquid manifestation of this asset class, the majority of insurance-linked capital is deployed through privately negotiated structures — sidecars, collateralized reinsurance, industry loss warranties, quota-share vehicles, and other bespoke forms of alternative risk transfer. These instruments are typically not exchange-traded and are instead structured through bilateral or club-style arrangements between insurers, reinsurers, brokers, and institutional investors. Despite their relative opacity, they represent a substantial and systemically important share of global reinsurance capacity, particularly in property catastrophe markets. Total alternative reinsurance capital — including catastrophe bonds, sidecars, collateralized reinsurance, and ILS fund structures — reached approximately $124 billion by the third quarter of 2025, according to Aon Securities, making ILS the largest single source of catastrophe capacity in the global insurance market.
Corvid Partners is a global leader in the valuation, structuring, and analysis of complex insurance-linked and structured finance instruments, including catastrophe bonds, sidecars, collateralized reinsurance vehicles, weather-risk securitizations, mortality-linked securities, and other forms of alternative risk transfer. Members of Corvid have traded, structured, valued, and advised on these instruments across multiple market cycles — from the early expansion of alternative reinsurance capital in the mid-2000s through the sidecar wave following Katrina, the trapped collateral crisis of 2017 to 2019, and the current environment characterized by higher base rates, wider spreads, increased climate volatility, and the growing dominance of dedicated ILS funds and pension capital. That experience includes direct desk-level involvement in resolving the collateral positions affected by Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy in September 2008 — work conducted at Barclays following its acquisition of Lehman's U.S. broker-dealer operations — which required working through the cat bond and ILS TRS counterparty positions that Lehman held at the moment the market's collateral architecture was being remade from scratch, and which grounded Corvid's analytical framework in a first-hand understanding of how ILS structures behave under financial market stress rather than catastrophe event stress.
https://www.bis.org/publ/joint34.htm
https://www.chicagofed.org/publications/chicago-fed-letter/2018/405
The Nature of Alternative Reinsurance Capital
The term alternative reinsurance capital describes the broader structural shift in which institutional investors have become direct providers of insurance risk capital. This includes pension funds, endowments, sovereign wealth funds, hedge funds, and ILS managers deploying capital through fully collateralized structures, quota-share participations, and derivative-like instruments. These arrangements allow sponsors to access incremental capacity without issuing equity or relying on rated reinsurance counterparties, while offering investors exposure to risks that are largely orthogonal to traditional financial markets. The fully collateralized nature of most ILS structures eliminates counterparty credit risk — converting reinsurance exposure into a form more analogous to funded credit risk, albeit driven by stochastic physical events rather than corporate fundamentals — and this feature became particularly important to regulators and cedants after the global financial crisis.
https://content.naic.org/insurance-topics/insurance-linked-securities
https://www.artemis.bm/dashboard/
The modern ILS market emerged in the 1990s in response to capacity constraints following Hurricane Andrew and the 1994 Northridge earthquake, both of which exposed the limitations of balance-sheet reinsurance in absorbing truly severe catastrophes. Initial development focused on catastrophe bonds, but private structures rapidly became the dominant mechanism for capital deployment due to their flexibility, speed of execution, and ability to tailor risk exposures without the public securities issuance process a cat bond requires. The evolution of the market reflects a progressive institutionalization — from opportunistic hedge fund and proprietary desk capital in the early years, through the first dedicated ILS fund managers in the late 1990s and early 2000s, to the current environment where pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, and large alternative asset managers including Blackstone and Brookfield have emerged as active ILS participants, providing capital at lower return hurdles than traditional private equity and integrating ILS with broader fixed-income and private debt strategies.
https://www.bis.org/publ/joint34.htm
https://www.artemis.bm/dashboard/
Sidecars — Structure, History, and the Post-Katrina Wave
A reinsurance sidecar is a special purpose vehicle that enables third-party investors to participate directly in a reinsurer's underwriting portfolio via quota-share agreements. The reinsurer cedes a defined proportion of its premiums and losses to the sidecar, which is capitalized by equity from investors and fully collateralized. The sponsor typically serves as the exclusive underwriting manager, earning a management fee and profit participation, while investors receive the underwriting returns of the ceded book without any exposure to the sponsor's general balance sheet or accumulated liabilities from prior years. This last feature — the clean, ring-fenced exposure to current-year underwriting at hard-market prices — is precisely what makes sidecars attractive immediately after major loss events when reinsurance pricing is most elevated and new investors are reluctant to commit equity to established reinsurers with uncertain legacy reserves.
https://www.artemis.bm/library/reinsurance-sidecars/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reinsurance_sidecar
The sidecar concept predates Katrina. RenaissanceRe established DaVinci Reinsurance Ltd. in October 2001, making it one of the oldest sidecar vehicles in the market's history and the direct predecessor of all subsequent structures. At launch, DaVinci had approximately $500 million in capital, with RenaissanceRe serving as the exclusive underwriting manager and owning a minority equity stake with majority voting control. The vehicle was recapitalized to $320.6 million in early 2006, with $50 million contributed by RenRe itself and the balance from third-party investors — a structure Moody's subsequently described as both "core and strategic" to RenaissanceRe's reinsurance business. By 2015, DaVinci was approximately 77 percent capitalized by third-party investors, and by early 2024 AIG had allocated $350 million to the DaVinci structure as part of a broader $566 million capital raise by RenaissanceRe's partner capital platform in Q1 2024 alone. RenaissanceRe also established Top Layer Re in 1999 as a 50/50 joint venture with State Farm, specifically targeting high excess non-U.S. property catastrophe reinsurance — a structure with $4 billion in capacity supported by stop-loss reinsurance provided by State Farm and gross written premiums of $38.8 million in its first full year of 2001. Total partner capital across RenaissanceRe's external and internal commitments reached $10.01 billion as of January 1, 2026.
https://www.artemis.bm/reinsurance-sidecars/davinci-re/
https://www.artemis.bm/news/renaissancere-raised-566m-third-party-capital-fee-income-rose-87-in-q1/
The post-Katrina sidecar wave of 2005 to 2007 established the structure as a market institution. By year-end 2005, three new sidecars were operational — Cyrus Re, which deposited $525 million into trust to support XL Re's quota-share coverage; Flatiron Re; and Blue Ocean Re — with investors including Highfields Capital, Farallon Capital, and West End Capital. Twenty sidecars were formed across 2006, representing $4.5 billion in capital according to AM Best. The 2006 and 2007 sidecar cohort captured exceptional returns during the hard market following a catastrophe-free 2006, reinforcing the asset class's event-driven cyclical logic. As the market softened in 2007, only eight new sidecars formed, representing $1.87 billion in capital. By 2008, formations were declining further as investors recognized that late-cycle sidecar returns in a soft market were insufficient to justify the illiquidity. Cyrus Re II — successor to the original $525 million Cyrus Re — placed only $136 million into trust for 2008 coverage, a contraction of nearly 75 percent. Helicon Reinsurance, which had provided quota-share retrocessional coverage to White Mountains Re, was acquired by White Mountains and placed into runoff as the cycle softened.
https://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20080127/ISSUE01/100023951
https://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/reinsurance/41568/inside-the-reinsurance-sidecar
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reinsurance_sidecar
The sidecar market contracted through the 2017-2019 loss period — discussed in detail below — before undergoing a dramatic recovery. Outstanding sidecar capital reached approximately $8.4 billion in 2015, then shrank materially before resurgence began for the 2024 underwriting year. The market reached $10 billion by mid-2024 — a 40 percent year-on-year expansion according to Aon Securities — then $17 billion by June 2025, $19.6 billion by September 2025, and according to AM Best has grown approximately 183 percent since 2023. The current market consists of a property sidecar segment at $17.9 billion of invested capital and a casualty sidecar segment at $1.7 billion, the latter a genuinely new development driven by improving casualty insurance pricing, higher interest rates, and investor appetite for long-dated investment float. Notable 2025 casualty sidecar transactions include QBE Re's George Street Re at over $550 million in fully collateralized quota share reinsurance, Aspen/PIMCO's Pando Re, Ledger Investing's $100 million unnamed global reinsurer casualty sidecar, and Starwind's $270 million Fractal Re for casualty risk programs.
Collateralized Reinsurance — The Core Engine of Alternative Capital
Collateralized reinsurance has become the dominant mechanism of private ILS capital deployment. In these transactions, investors provide fully funded reinsurance protection, with collateral equal to maximum potential losses held in a segregated trust account for the duration of the contract. The structure fundamentally alters the counterparty credit risk profile relative to traditional reinsurance: because obligations are fully funded, the sponsor's recovery depends on the collateral and the trigger mechanics rather than on the financial condition of the protection seller. This feature became particularly important after the 2008 financial crisis, when counterparty risk across financial institutions was repriced and regulators increasingly favored collateralized structures for their transparency and ring-fenced capital.
https://www.captive.com/articles/insurance-linked-securities-and-collateral-an-essential-overview
https://content.naic.org/sites/default/files/capital-markets-primer-linked-securities.pdf
From a trading perspective, collateralized reinsurance is characterized by limited liquidity, bilateral negotiation, and mark-to-model valuation. Secondary activity exists but is episodic and highly dependent on updated catastrophe model outputs and loss development. Unlike catastrophe bonds, where secondary prices are observable and reflect a functioning specialist investor market, collateralized reinsurance positions are typically valued using updated vendor model runs and qualitative judgment about loss creep. This opacity — combined with the absence of public price discovery — means that collateralized reinsurance fund valuations in the aftermath of a major loss event can diverge materially from eventual settled values, a dynamic that became the central risk management and investor communication challenge in the 2017-2019 period.
Florida Citizens' reinsurance program is the most visible annual demonstration of how dominant collateralized and ILS capital has become in peak-zone catastrophe reinsurance. At the 2024 renewal, collateralized and ILS fund sources collectively provided 81 percent of Florida Citizens' total reinsurance arrangements — up from 67 percent the prior year and the highest level of ILS support in the program's history. Within the traditional reinsurance tower of approximately $1.964 billion, Nephila Capital was the single largest participant at $587 million, or approximately 30 percent of the tower. D.E. Shaw followed at $270 million through Bermuda-based cells of D.E. Shaw Re, then Aeolus Capital Management at $252.5 million through Aeolus Re Ltd., and Pillar Capital Management at approximately $76.9 million underwritten through Hannover Re paper.
Industry Loss Warranties — Speed, Standardization, and Basis Risk
Industry loss warranties are derivative-like reinsurance contracts that trigger based on aggregate losses across the insurance industry as measured by a third-party index — in the U.S., typically PCS catastrophe series data from Verisk. Unlike indemnity reinsurance, which pays based on the buyer's actual losses, an ILW pays when the industry aggregate loss crosses a defined dollar threshold, regardless of the buyer's individual experience. This introduces basis risk — the buyer's actual losses may diverge meaningfully from the industry aggregate — but the structure allows for rapid execution, standardization, and active secondary trading that is not possible for indemnity collateralized reinsurance.
https://www.artemis.bm/library/what-are-industry-loss-warranties-ilws/
https://www.verisk.com/solutions/claims/investigation/catastrophe-claims-data/
ILWs are among the most liquid instruments in the private ILS market and are actively traded among reinsurers, hedge funds, and ILS managers, including as live-cat coverage while a storm is approaching landfall and as dead-cat coverage after an event has occurred but before the final loss is known. The market offers several structural variants — binary ILWs that pay a fixed dollar amount when the trigger is breached, proportional ILWs that pay in proportion to how much the industry loss exceeds the trigger, and dual-trigger structures requiring both an industry threshold and a minimum loss to the buyer. ILW capacity is estimated at $5 billion to $7 billion annually according to AM Best, while Nephila has estimated the total annual volume of ILW trading including hybrids at approximately $25 billion. Following the 2017 hurricane season, ILW payouts were expected to be in the billions — one ILW trader told Artemis that as much as $2 billion in ILWs were expected to trigger for Harvey and Irma combined, with Harvey's industry loss ultimately estimated in the $15 billion to $25 billion range and Irma's U.S. industry loss estimated at $25 billion to $35 billion by AIR Worldwide.
https://www.artemis.bm/news/industry-loss-warranty-ilw-payouts-could-be-in-the-billions/
The 2017-2018 Trapped Collateral Crisis — The Market's Defining Structural Test
The catastrophe loss years of 2017 and 2018 produced the most significant structural test the ILS market had faced since the 2008 Lehman collateral episode, and the lessons from that period fundamentally reshaped how investors evaluate and price collateral lock-up risk in private ILS structures.
Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria struck the United States and Caribbean in rapid succession in the third quarter of 2017, producing combined industry losses of approximately $70 billion to $100 billion — more losses than were incurred in every U.S. hurricane from 2006 to 2016 combined. The ILS and alternative capital market's share of those losses was estimated by AM Best at $20 billion to $25 billion, with the great majority of that loss falling not on catastrophe bonds — which were mostly protected by their higher attachment points — but on collateralized reinsurance, sidecars, and ILWs that had written lower in reinsurance towers and as retrocessional coverage.
https://www.captive.com/news/harvey-irma-and-marias-impact-on-the-alternative-capital-market
https://www.artemis.bm/news/lack-of-transparency-hindered-ils-hurricane-loss-estimation-report/
The mechanism that amplified the damage beyond the initial loss was trapped collateral. In collateralized reinsurance, a cedant holds back a buffer margin of collateral in trust in excess of the initial loss estimate, protecting against adverse development of the reserve position. This means that even a cedant whose losses do not ultimately breach the attachment point of the coverage may trap collateral for months while the loss estimate develops. When multiple large losses occur in the same year — Harvey, Irma, and Maria in 2017, then Typhoon Jebi, Hurricane Florence, and the California wildfires in 2018 — the aggregate trapped collateral across the market compounds rapidly. By November 2017, Moody's RMS estimated that approximately $10 billion in ILS collateral was trapped. By the end of 2018, following the second catastrophe-heavy year, estimates ranged from $18 billion to as much as $25 billion trapped or impaired. At the January 2019 renewals JLT estimated $20 billion remained trapped, and AM Best put the figure at approximately 20 to 25 percent of total ILS capital. By the end of Q1 2019, Aon estimated trapped collateral had declined to approximately $15 billion — roughly 16 percent of the ILS market's available collateral. AM Best noted that the drag on investment returns from locked-up collateral could run as high as 20 percent in the worst-affected funds, forcing a structural repricing of collateral lock-up risk that permanently changed how collateralized reinsurance contracts were negotiated and priced.
https://www.artemis.bm/news/trapped-ils-collateral-shrinks-in-2019-as-losses-begin-to-crystalise/
https://www.rms.com/blog/2017/11/16/the-case-of-the-trapped-collateral
The market's response was structural. ILS fund managers developed side-pocket mechanisms to segregate loss-impacted investments from clean capital, allowing the unaffected portion of a fund's portfolio to continue trading while the trapped positions developed. Contract terms were tightened to provide better protection for investors against excessive buffer margin requirements and to ensure more balanced treatment between cedant protection and investor liquidity. The sidecar market — which had been particularly affected because sidecar terms in the 2015-2017 soft market period had been poorly aligned — underwent the most significant structural reform, with the recovery to $10 billion in 2024 and $19.6 billion in 2025 attributable directly to the improved terms installed after the loss period rather than merely to improved pricing.
Named ILS Fund Managers — The Institutional Infrastructure of the Market
Nephila Capital is the most important named participant in the institutional ILS fund management landscape and the largest ILS fund manager by assets under management for most of the market's history. Founded in Bermuda and acquired by Markel in 2018, Nephila pioneered the multi-strategy ILS fund approach across cat bonds, collateralized reinsurance, and ILWs — establishing the template for the dedicated ILS fund structure that now dominates the investor side of the market. Nephila reached peak AUM of $12.2 billion in mid-2018, then declined through the 2017-2019 loss and trapped collateral period before stabilizing at $6.6 billion in H1 2024 as legacy reserve positions were resolved through adverse development reinsurance and ILW hedging arrangements. Nephila's ILW hedging program for its own portfolio reached $168 million in gross written premiums ceded in H1 2024 — a structural innovation reflecting how large ILS managers now use the same instruments for which they are protection sellers to hedge their own book's downside. The Florida State Board of Administration awarded Nephila a $300 million mandate in Q1 2024 to deploy into reinsurance through its Arachne Bermuda structure, reflecting the continued institutional appetite for Nephila's platform even after the AUM decline.
https://www.artemis.bm/news/nephila-capital-adds-11-to-reach-12-2bn-of-ils-assets-managed/
RenaissanceRe's Capital Partners platform — encompassing DaVinci Re, Top Layer Re, Vermeer Re, Medici, and more recently Fontana Holdings for casualty and specialty risk — represents the most successful integration of third-party capital into a balance-sheet reinsurer's franchise. RenRe's model has always been to offer side-by-side participation with its own underwriting rather than competing with it, creating aligned incentives between the sponsor and the third-party capital providers that the post-2017 experience validated as the structurally superior approach. Other major ILS fund managers active in private structures include Aeolus Capital Management, Pillar Capital Management, Fermat Capital, Securis, Twelve Capital, Elementum Advisors, and Hudson Structured Capital Management, each with distinct strategies across different layers, perils, and instrument types within the ILS universe.
https://www.renre.com/capital-partners/
https://www.artemis.bm/ils-fund-managers/renaissancere-capital-partners/
Pricing Framework — Expected Loss Multiples and Cycle Awareness
ILS instruments are priced as spread over collateral yield, with expected loss — derived from vendor catastrophe models — serving as the primary anchor for relative value assessment. The multiple-of-expected-loss framework that practitioners use to evaluate relative value across transactions, perils, and market conditions is the most practically useful analytical tool in this market. At the desk level, the discipline runs broadly as follows. A multiple below 2.0x expected loss is generally unattractive except for highly remote risks or strategic participations, and represents late-cycle or highly competitive market conditions. A multiple between 2.0x and 2.5x reflects competitive but rational late-cycle pricing. A multiple between 2.5x and 3.5x represents balanced or normalized market conditions. A multiple above 3.5x typically signals a dislocated or post-event opportunity. These ranges are not static — they must be interpreted in the context of the specific peril, attachment point, trigger type, model uncertainty, and liquidity of the instrument being evaluated.
https://www.artemis.bm/dashboard/
Vendor catastrophe models — RMS (Moody's RMS), AIR Worldwide (Verisk), and Moody's — provide the baseline expected loss estimates that anchor this framework, but experienced practitioners apply overlays for model bias, version drift, climate non-stationarity, exposure data quality, and tail correlation. Internal overlay assumptions typically result in higher effective expected loss estimates than headline model outputs, particularly for peak zone perils where model uncertainty is highest and the consequences of underestimating expected loss are most severe. The 2017-2018 experience, in which realized losses significantly exceeded modeled expectations in several product lines, reinforced the importance of conservative model overlays and demonstrated that market-clearing multiples in the soft market of 2014-2016 had been inadequate to compensate for model uncertainty even at face value expected loss estimates.
https://catmodeling.lehigh.edu/
https://www.artemis.bm/dashboard/
The cyclicality of the ILS market is pronounced and predictable in its qualitative pattern even if not in its timing. The most attractive opportunities have historically emerged immediately post-event, during periods of elevated trapped collateral constraining new capital formation, and when traditional reinsurance capacity is simultaneously constrained by catastrophe losses to their own balance sheets. Late-cycle environments — characterized by abundant capital, compressed multiples, and loose contract terms — require heightened selectivity and willingness to reduce exposure, as the combination of inadequate pricing and unfavorable structural terms creates asymmetric downside risk when the inevitable loss year arrives.
Differences Between Cat Bonds and Private ILS
Catastrophe bonds and private ILS instruments occupy different positions on the liquidity-customization spectrum. Cat bonds are public notes registered or placed under Rule 144A, typically running three to five years, with moderate secondary market liquidity among specialist ILS investors and observable bid-ask spreads. Private structures — collateralized reinsurance, sidecars, ILWs — are bilateral or club-style contracts with one to three year durations, high customization, fast execution, and low to essentially zero secondary liquidity. Private structures typically clear at wider spreads to compensate for illiquidity, structural complexity, and mark-to-model exposure. Indemnity triggers dominate private structures because sponsors prefer the alignment between their actual losses and the risk transfer they are purchasing, accepting the slower settlement process as a trade-off.
https://content.naic.org/sites/default/files/capital-markets-primer-linked-securities.pdf
https://www.finra.org/investors/insights/insurance-linked-securities
The correlation question that motivates much institutional interest in the asset class — the observation that catastrophe risk is driven by geophysical and climatic variables rather than macroeconomic cycles — is largely valid in normal environments but requires significant qualification. The 2008 experience demonstrated that financial market stress can affect cat bond collateral values and market liquidity even without a qualifying catastrophe event. The growing frequency of climate-driven catastrophes raises the possibility that events affecting multiple instruments simultaneously — U.S. hurricanes, European windstorms, Japanese typhoons, California wildfires, severe convective storms — could create correlated adverse years across the ILS universe rather than the diversified outcomes the theoretical framework assumes. And the trapped collateral mechanism creates a form of endogenous illiquidity that amplifies losses beyond what the underlying events alone would produce, because capital that is locked against one event is unavailable to redeploy into the hard market that event creates.
https://catmodeling.lehigh.edu/
Regulatory and Structural Considerations
ILS structures may fall under both insurance and securities regulatory regimes depending on jurisdiction and form. Offshore domiciles — Bermuda, Cayman Islands, and Ireland primarily — have developed specialized frameworks for ILS issuance and collateralized reinsurance vehicles that provide regulatory clarity, tax neutrality, and established legal frameworks for bankruptcy-remote special purpose entities. Key structural considerations include the form and quality of collateral, the buffer margin mechanics governing when and how collateral is released, the alignment of trigger definitions between the reinsurance agreement and the ILS instrument, counterparty governance, and the specific legal rights of investors in the SPV in the event of sponsor insolvency or dispute.
https://content.naic.org/insurance-topics/insurance-linked-securities
https://www.bis.org/publ/joint34.htm
Conclusion
The ILS and alternative reinsurance capital market has evolved from a post-Katrina innovation into a $124 billion institutional asset class that is now the largest single source of catastrophe capacity in the global insurance market. The structural arc from the first DaVinci Re sidecar in 2001 and the post-Katrina $4.5 billion sidecar cohort of 2006 through the 2017-2019 trapped collateral crisis, the side-pocket innovations that followed, and the current expansion of sidecar capital to nearly $20 billion including new casualty and specialty structures represents a market that has repeatedly been stress-tested, reformed, and emerged larger and more structurally sound than before. The expansion of institutional investor participation from hedge funds to pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, and now private credit managers including Blackstone and Brookfield reflects the genuine maturation of the asset class beyond its opportunistic origins.
Corvid Partners brings to private ILS analysis the integrated disciplines that this market demands — catastrophe model literacy sufficient to construct and challenge vendor expected loss estimates, structured credit experience sufficient to evaluate collateral mechanics, waterfall provisions, and trigger design, and cycle awareness calibrated across multiple hard and soft market episodes including the defining structural events of 2008 and 2017-2019. The desk-level experience of the firm's principals in resolving Lehman's TRS counterparty positions in the cat bond market at Barclays following the 2008 bankruptcy, combined with the ongoing analytical work across collateralized reinsurance, sidecars, and ILW structures through subsequent market cycles, provides the foundational framework for evaluating these instruments where they most require expertise — in stressed environments where modeled assumptions diverge from realized outcomes and where the gap between contractual protections and practical recovery determines actual investor experience.
https://www.artemis.bm/dashboard/
Bibliography
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https://www.artemis.bm/dashboard/
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https://www.artemis.bm/library/reinsurance-sidecars/
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https://www.artemis.bm/library/what-are-industry-loss-warranties-ilws/
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https://www.artemis.bm/reinsurance-sidecars/davinci-re/
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https://www.renre.com/capital-partners/
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https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000913144/000095013602000956/file001.txt
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https://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20080127/ISSUE01/100023951
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reinsurance_sidecar
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Artemis — Reinsurance Sidecar Market Grew More than $5bn in 2025
Artemis — Alternative Capital Hits $124bn (third-party capital Q3 2025, Blackstone/Brookfield entry, sidecar $19.6B)
Artemis — Reinsurance Sidecar Market Estimated at Record $10bn in 2024 (40% year-on-year growth, previous high $8.4B in 2015)
Artemis — Reinsurance Sidecar Market Estimated to Have Grown 183% Since 2023 (AM Best $16-18B, QBE Re George Street Re $550M)
Artemis — ILS Capacity Recovering in Sidecars, ILWs, Collateralized Reinsurance (AM Best $5-7B ILW capacity, $6-8B sidecar capacity estimate 2024)
Artemis — Collateralized/ILS Take 66% of Florida Citizens Reinsurance (Nephila $587M, D.E. Shaw $270M, Aeolus $252.5M, Pillar $76.9M; 81% ILS share)
Artemis — Nephila ILS Revenues Rise, AUM $6.6bn (ILW fronting $168M H1 2024, Arachne $300M Florida SBA mandate)
Artemis — Nephila Capital Adds 11% to Reach $12.2bn (peak AUM mid-2018)
https://www.artemis.bm/news/nephila-capital-adds-11-to-reach-12-2bn-of-ils-assets-managed/
Artemis — Trapped ILS Collateral Shrinks in 2019 ($18-25B trapped end-2018, $20B at January 2019 renewals, $15B Q1 2019; 20% drag on returns)
https://www.artemis.bm/news/trapped-ils-collateral-shrinks-in-2019-as-losses-begin-to-crystalise/
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https://www.rms.com/blog/2017/11/16/the-case-of-the-trapped-collateral
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https://www.captive.com/news/harvey-irma-and-marias-impact-on-the-alternative-capital-market
Artemis — ILW Payouts Could Be in the Billions ($2B ILW payouts expected Harvey/Irma, Harvey $15-25B industry loss, Irma $25-35B AIR estimate)
https://www.artemis.bm/news/industry-loss-warranty-ilw-payouts-could-be-in-the-billions/
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https://www.bis.org/publ/joint34.htm
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https://content.naic.org/sites/default/files/capital-markets-primer-linked-securities.pdf
Aon — Reinsurance Market Dynamics January 2025 (sidecar continued expansion, casualty structures, $715B global reinsurer capital)
Corvid Partners